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JUDICIAL REFORM IN PENNSYLVANIA
By MERCER D.

TATEt

antiquated and archaic judicial system has
been the subject of much scrutiny in recent years.' This is part of
a nationwide movement toward judicial reform, a movement which
has found expression in one form or another in numerous states within
PENNSYLVANIA'S

the last decade.

2

The "spark that kindled the white flame of progress" in judicial
reform was Roscoe Pound's address to the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association in 1906. 3 Pound's now famous analysis of
"the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice" has stood the test of time. There are some, he said, who are
dissatisfied with any legal system because of the mechanical operation
of legal rules, the difference in the rate of progress between law and
public opinion, the popular assumption that the administration of justice is an easy task for which anyone is competent and the popular
impatience of restraint. There are others, he said, whose dissatisfaction
is peculiar to the Anglo-American system of law because of the individualist spirit of the common law; the common law doctrine of cont A.B., 1952, Amherst College; LL.B., 1955, Harvard University; Member of
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tentious procedure which tends to make litigation an endless game;
the political jealousies which put political issues into the courts under
our doctrine of supremacy of law, and the lack of any general legal
philosophy which results in petty tinkering instead of comprehensive
reform. There are still others, he said, whose dissatisfaction is peculiar
to judicial organization and procedure in the United States because of
our multiplicity of courts, our preservation of concurrent jurisdictions
and our waste of judicial power arising out of rigidity of districts,
excessive attention to procedural points and unnecessary retrials. And
there are still others, he said, whose dissatisfaction arises from the
environment of judicial administration in the United States because
of a popular lack of interest in justice; the strain on our laws because
they also have to do the work of morality; the involvement of our
courts in politics; the tendency of the legal profession to become a
trade, and the public ignorance of the real workings of the courts due
to ignorant and sensational press reports. Judicial reform has been a
slow process, but Pound lived to see the reform movement take hold
and spread wide and far.
The problems in Pennsylvania have centered on three areas: (1)
the selection and tenure of judges; (2) the administration and efficient
organization of the judicial system; and (3) the minor judiciary. It
is not the purpose of this article to demonstrate the need for judicial
reform in Pennsylvania, since this is well known to most of the readers
of this Review and has been amply set forth elsewhere.4
The Pennsylvania Bar Association has for several years been
working intensively on a program of constitutional reform for Pennsylvania. This program has been popularly known as "Project Constitution," and central to its work has been revision of Article V, the
Judiciary Article, of the present Constitution of 1874.
While the method of constitutional revision in Pennsylvania is
not the-subject of this article, it is important to point out that the efforts
of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, and at present all efforts in Pennsylvania, are directed toward revision by the "Article by Article"
method.5 (The voters of Pennsylvania have repeatedly rejected the call
of a Constitutional Convention to rewrite the entire Pennsylvania
Constitution, most recently in November, 1963.)
The revision of Article V proposed by the Pennsylvania Bar
Association was considered by the Pennsylvania State Legislature
during 1964 and rejected. It will, in all probability, be resubmitted
4. See ScHULMAN, op. cit. supra note 1.
5. See Witwer, Action Programs to Achieve Judicial Reform, 43 J. Am.

JUD.

Soc'Y 162 (1960).
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with some revisions in 1965. It must be passed by a majority of each
House of two successive General Assemblies and by a majority of the
electorate of the Commonwealth. 6
I.
SELECTION

AND

7

TENURE OF JUDGES

Under the present Constitution., all of Pennsylvania's judges are
elected by the partisan competitive method in primary and general
elections for terms of 10 years in the lower courts and 21 years on
the Supreme Court.' There is no provision for retirement. Vacancies are filled by the governor by appointment to continue until the
next general election.' There is no limitation on the governor's choice
in filling vacancies, and candidates for election to judgships are chosen
in the same manner as candidates for all other elective offices in the
Commonwealth. This means that the polictical parties play a major
role in choosing candidates, and judgships are too frequently regarded
as plums for the repayment of political debts.
The basic evil is the competitive election of Pennsylvania judges."
With the exception of some cantons in Switzerland, no democracy,
other than the States of the United States, elects its judges.' In
fact, from 1776 until 1838, Pennsylvania's constitutions provided that
all judges be appointed with life tenure on good behavior, and thereafter, as part of a national movement toward popular control of government, judges became elected officials. 2 It has been said that popular
election of judges is deceptive democracy and tends only to confuse
the voter.'" This feature of Pennsylvania's constitutional system has
been minimized to some degree by the so-called "sitting judge principle," by which a judge currently in office, either by appointment or
by election, who must stand for election or re-election, will not be
opposed by a candidate from the other political party. This principle has
found its greatest strength in Philadelphia, and it has been applied
more at the local level than at the statewide level. However, the prin6. PA. CONST. art. XVIII (1874).
7. For a good history of this problem, see Nelson, Variations on a Theme Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 So. CAL. L. Rev. 4 (1962).
8. PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 15.

9. Id. at art. V, § 25.
10. See SCHULMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 19-28.
11. PA. BAR ASS'N, IN SUPPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA PLAN FOR THE SELECTION
AND TENURE OF JUDESS 3 (1961).
12. Ibid.

13. Id. at 5. In 1937 in Philadelphia there were 106 candidates for 14 judgeships.
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ciple has never had universal acceptance in Pennsylvania (or even in
Philadelphia), and has been followed only sporadically. 4 It definitely
has not cured the defect in the judicial system.
The proposal presented by the Pennsylvania Bar Association embodies the "Pennsylvania Plan."' 5 Under it, when a vacancy exists
in the office of judge of an appellate court or in a court of record in
Philadelphia or Allegheny Counties, the Governor shall fill it by
appointment from a panel of three persons nominated to him by a nonpartisan Judicial Nominating Commission. If the Governor fails to
act favorably on any of these nominees within 60 days, the Judicial
Nominating Commission will nominate a second panel of three, and
if the Governor shall fail to nominate a person from the second panel
within 30 days, the appointment will be made by the Chief Justice
from the persons nominated in either panel.
The Judicial Nominating Commission, composed of one judge,
three members of the bar selected by a plan to be promulgated by the
Supreme Court and three lay citizens appointed by the Governor, all
for three year terms, is the core of the Pennsylvania Plan. There is
to be one commission for the appellate courts, chosen from the Commonwealth at large, and another for each judicial district is chosen from
that district, except that the judge may be chosen from outside the
district.
During his term of service, which is to be without compensation
except for expenses, no member of the Judicial Nominating Commission may hold any office in a political party organization, and only
the judge may hold public office or salaried appointment. Such a
commission has been used already in Pennsylvania, having been appointed by Governor Scranton in January 1964 to fill five vacancies
in Philadelphia. It has also been used to fill vacancies in New York
City and Denver.' 6
Each judge appointed by the governor serves a trial period of
at least 24 months, and thereafter at an appropriate election (general
14. See SCHULMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 28-31. A graphic example of the
evils of partisan election of judges has been related by W. St. John Garwood, a retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas. In the 1948 Texas primary Judge
Garwood's opponent was a man named Jefferson Smith, who had previously run
unsuccessfully for minor statewide offices, had no listed law office or any noticeable
reputation as a lawyer and who was known as a lawyer to "hardly one out of 50
lawyers" in his home town; Smith's name was regarded as more attractive politically,
because it had no disadvantageous religious connotation, as did Justice Garwood's
name; furthermore, the hero of a television show which was popular at that time in
Texas was also named Jefferson Smith. Judge Garwood was elected by only a handful
of votes. Garwood, Judicial Selection and Tenure - The Model Article Provisions,

47 J. Am.Juo. Soc'Y 21 (1963).
15. PA. BAR Ass'N, PROposzD Ntw JUDICIARY ARTICLt (Oct. 1964).
16. Winters, supra note 2, at 21.
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for appellate judge and municipal for local judge), the name of the
judge, if he so chooses, is submitted, unopposed, to the voters on a
separate ballot without party designation. The single question is
whether the judge shall be retained in office.
If a majority of voters who mark the judicial ballot favor
the retention of the judge in office, he serves for a full term and at
its expiration may run again, unopposed, for another term. He runs
on his record only, rather than against a political opponent. If the
voters decide the judge is not to be retained, the vacancy is filled by
appointment from a panel of three names nominated to the Governor
by the Judicial Nominating Commission as set forth above.
At any municipal election the qualified voters of any judicial
district, other than Philadelphia and Alleghany Counties (where it
will be mandatory), may elect to adopt this plan, or, having adopted
it, may elect to discontinue it. Either of these questions may be placed
on the ballot for any judicial district by petition signed by not less
than 200 qualified electors of the district. Upon adoption of the Article,
all sitting judges in the courts affected will be subject to the provisions
of the plan. The Plan embodies features of both the federal and the
elective systems. Its appointive features will tend to insure the selection of judges of the highest possible competence. Popular control by
the electorate is retained, but partisan political contests are eliminated.
The proposal also provides that the term for judges of all courts
shall be ten years, except on the new Community Courts, where the
term can be less if so set by the General Assembly. The Chief Justice
of Pennsylvania is to be elected for five year terms by the members
of the Supreme Court, and may succeed himself. The Chief Justice
may resign without resigning from the Court. The Chief Justice
shall appoint the President Judges of all courts covered by the Pennsylvania Plan, except that the President Judges of the Community Court
and of any division of the District Court shall be appointed by the
President Judge of the District, to serve in each case at the pleasure
of the appointor.
The Plan would be a vast improvement for Pennsylvania. The
one weak feature of the Plan is that it is not mandatorily applicable
to local judges in counties other than Philadelphia and Allegheny. It
should be.
The proposal of the Pennsylvania Bar Association also suggests
significant changes with respect to compensation and retirement of
judges. While Pennsylvania has generally provided by statute quite
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
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adequate compensation for its judges,'" it has been silent on the question of retirement. Under the proposal, judicial salaries shall be set
by statute. The General Assembly may, under the proposal, provide
for retirement of judges at an age not less than 70 years; it may also
provide that retired judges may receive compensation and may, with
their consent, be assigned by the Supreme Court to render such judicial
service as may be prescribed by Rule of the Supreme Court.
The proposal also provides that a judge's office will be forfeited
if he becomes a candidate for an elective non-judicial office, is convicted
of misbehavior in office or is disbarred as a member of the Supreme
Court. Retirement for mental or physical incapacity and impeachment
are also provided for. A judge may be removed, suspended or disciplined for professional misconduct.'"
The proposal also prohibits the imposition upon the Courts or
upon judges thereof of non-judicial duties or responsibility for making
appointments, except those related to the judicial power or the administration of the courts.'" No judge may make any contribution
(except to a member of his family) to or hold any office in a political
party or organization, nor, while in office, become a candidate for any
elective non-judicial office.
Judges are prohibited from practicing law and from engaging in
any other employment for compensation. This prohibition, however,
does not extend to lecturing, teaching, writing, acting as an officer in
a non-profit professional organizal.ion or acting as a fiduciary of the
estate of a member of his family.
Judicial duties cannot be efficiently and effectively discharged
until judges are free of political duty, including those required by
campaigns for election and re-election. The proposed "Pennsylvania
Plan" is similar to that which has been in effect in Missouri since 1940
and more recently, and with some variations, in other states. 20

It is

also similar to the provisions for selection and tenure of the American
17. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court receives annual salary of $33,000,
associate justices $32,500. The President Judge of the Superior Court receives $31,000,
associate judges $30,500. Judges of the Courts of Common Pleas (who also serve as
judges of the Courts of Quarter Sessions) and judges of the Orphans' Courts receive
$21,500 to $25,000, depending on the population of the judicial district (Dauphin
County, $27,500). The President Judge of the County Courts receives $23,000, associate
judges $22,500. The Chief Magistrate of Philadelphia receives $15,000, other magistrates $12,500. Act of June 1, 1956, P.L. (1955) 1959, §§ 2-8, as amended, 17 P.S.
§§ 830.24-830.30. Act of June 15, 1937, P.L. 1743, No. 368, § 37, as amended, 42 P.S.
§ 1138B.
18. For a good analysis of the California approach to this problem, see Frankel,
Judicial Conduct and Removal of Judges For Cause In California, 36 So. CAL. L.
Rtv. 72 (1962).
19. For the non-judicial burdens presently borne by Pennsylvania judges, see
SCrULMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 250-76.
20. Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska. Winters, supra note 2.
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Bar Association's Model Judiciary Article.2 There are, however, some
significant variations from the Model Article.
First, in the Model Article, only one panel of three nominees need
be presented to the Governor before the Chief Justice may act, whereas
the Pennsylvania Plan provides for two, thus offering greater opportunity of choice to the Governor.
Second, magistrates under the Model Article are appointed by the
Chief Justice for three years, whereas the Pennsylvania Plan provides
for appointment in the same manner as other judges for terms of ten
years or less, as determined by the legislature. There does not seem to
be any sound reason why the minor judiciary should not be appointed
in the same manner as other judges, and doing so will increase the
prestige and respect, so desperately needed, for the minor judiciary.
Third, under the Model Article the trial period of an appointed
judge is three years, instead of two. The difference seems inconsequential.
Fourth, the minimum retirement age under the Model Article is
65, instead of 70. If it is thought necessary to state an age for retirement in the Constitution, age 65 would seem to offer greater latitude
to the state legislature and therefore seems preferable. It is provided
in at least one state constitution that retirement be mandatory at
age 70.2
Fifth, the Model Article provides that judicial salaries shall not
be less than the highest salary paid to an officer of the executive branch
of the State government other than the governor, and pensions (not
less than 50% of the salary at retirement for those of ten years or more
service, widows included) are constitutionally established. This seems
unnecessary to a basic law and has been eliminated from the Pennsylvania proposal.
Sixth, under the Model Article, the Chief Justice is selected by
the Judicial Nominating Commission, instead of by the members of
the Supreme Court. There are- good arguments for both of these proposals. A Chief Justice must work closely with the members of the
Supreme Court and therefore should be someone with whom they are
compatible. On the other hand, the Chief Justice is to have important
state-wide administrative responsibility, the capacity for which might
be better judged by a commission.
Seventh, the judge on the Judicial Nominating Commission under
the Model Article must be the Chief Justice of the State, a provision
21. Holt, The Model State Judiciary Article in Perspective, 47 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 6
(1963) ; Rosenman, A Better Way to Select Judges (Am Jud. Soc'y 1964).
22. Quinn, Judicial Administration and Selection - Old Problems in Our Newest
State, 44 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 86, 88 (1960).
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which would seem to impose heavy time-consuming and unnecessary
burdens on the Chief Justice. Pennsylvania's plan permits greater
flexibility and sharing of the load. Under it, the Supreme Court is
permitted to choose that judge who is best suited to serve.
Finally, the Model Article provides that members of the Judicial
Nominating Commission shall receive compensation as set by the legislature, whereas the Pennsylvania Plan specifically prohibits compensation. The Pennsylvania Plan would seem to be better designed to
attract members to a Commission motivated by public service.
The proposal of the Pennsylvania Bar Association also provides
that all judges shall at the time of selection be residents of and continue
to reside in the Judicial District for which they shall be selected.23
This means that a person who practices law in one county but resides
in another county may be selected to be a judge only in the county
where he resides but does not practice law. It is a device apparently
designed to keep out carpetbaggers, but, since all judges must be retained in office only by the consent of the electorate, would not they be
deprived of their office by the electorate if they were regarded as unworthy carpetbaggers? On the other hand, is the Commonwealth not
likely to be deprived of able judges from time to time if it cannot
choose persons who may live in a county other than that where their
principal professional contacts exist? The proposed article would seem
to be stronger if this residence requirement were left out, or, at least,
left to the General Assembly. If some limitation is deemed necessary,
would it not be more meaningful to limit a judge to the county where
he regularly practices law, or where he is admitted to the bar of the
District Court? The Model Judicial Article contains no such restriction, though a similar limitation was contained in recent reform in
Illinois.24
The Pennsylvania Plan is, however, a big step forward from
reform recently adopted in Illinois, where the Plan was conditioned on

adoption by two-thirds of the members of each house of the state
legislature and subsequent approval by a majority of the voters; the
whole concept of the Judicial Nominating Commission was eliminated.
and the Plan applied only to re-election, leaving each judge's initial
election open under all circumstances to the usual process of partisan
politics.25
23. They must also be citizens of the Commonwealth and members of the Bar of

the Superior Court.

24. Proposed Judicial Article, 50 ILL. B.J. 60, 63 (1961).
25. Proposed Judicial Article, 50 ILL. B.J. 60, 62, 63 (1961). For an excellent
review of the situation in other states, particularly Colorado, see McHendrie, Qualifications, Selection and Tenure of Judges, 33 ROCKY MT. L. RZv. 449 (1961).
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The theory of the plan is that there shall be responsible democratic control over the judiciary. Traditional partisan election is not
responsible and does not insure quality. Complete unfettered control
in the hands of the chief executive is thought by many not to be
democratic. A combination of the two, with appropriate checks and
balances, efficient and responsible, is what is proposed.
II.
THE ADMINISTRATION

OF THE

AND

EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Under the present Constitution, Pennsylvania has a Supreme
Court, which, in addition to appellate jurisdiction, has original jurisdiction over certain causes. The Constitution also establishes, in great
detail, Common Pleas Courts, Courts of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail Delivery, Courts of Quarter Sessions of the Peace, Orphans'
Courts, Magistrates Courts and "such other courts as the General
Assembly may from time to time establish." There is no unified system
of judicial administration, the necessary concomitant of the modern
judicial system well adapted to an urban and industrial society.26
2
The proposal presented by the Pennsylvania Bar Association 1
establishes a Supreme Court, a Superior Court, District Courts,
Estates Courts in certain counties and Community Courts. All of these
courts will be subject to the administrative supervision of the Supreme
Court acting through the Chief Justice and local supervision by the
chief judges of each of the individual courts which are created. The
District Courts are created as courts of original jurisdiction, which is
where court congestion is greatest and efficiency is most needed. Other
courts may be established by the General Assembly after certification
of their necessity by the Supreme Court.
There are to be seven justices of the Supreme Court, one of whom
shall be Chief Justice of Pennsylvania. In his absence, the senior
member of the Court shall serve in his place. Original jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court is abolished, but the Supreme Court may assume
jurisdiction of any action pending in another court at any stage of the
proceedings. Direct appeals from the District Court may be made as
of right only in cases of judgments imposing sentences of death or life
imprisonment; otherwise appeals shall be only in accordance with rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court.
26. Pound, Principles and Outline of a Modern Unified Court Organization, 23 J.

AM. JuD. Soc'y 225 (1940)'.
27. PA. BAR Ass'N, PROPOSED Nsw JUDICIARY ARTICLE (Oct. 1964).
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The Superior Court is to have nine judges, with additional judges
assignable from the District Courts or the Estates Courts by the Supreme Court, and the number of judges may be changed by the General
Assembly after certification of necessity by the Supreme Court. The
Superior Court may act in panels of three or more judges, and it shall
have no original jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction shall be strictly appellate,
in cases assigned to it by Supreme Court rule or in cases where the rules
are silent as to appeal. The President Judge of the Superior Court is
appointed from the Court by the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, and in
the absence of the President Judge the senior judge shall act in his
place.
There is to be one District Court for each judicial district. The
districts, and their judges, are to remain as at present, but may be
changed by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Supreme
Court. There is to be a President Judge of each District Court appointed by the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania. In each district which
now contains a separate Orphans' Court and in such others as may be
determined by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the
Supreme Court, there will be an Estates Court with the same powers
and duties as the present Orphans' Courts. The District Courts and
Estates Courts will have unlimited original jurisdiction except in such
cases as may be assigned exclusively to the Community Courts by rule
of the Supreme Court, in which latter cases the District Courts are to
have such powers of review as may be provided by the Supreme Court
Rules.
In Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties and other districts where
a majority of the voters so decide, the minor judiciary is abolished and
superseded by Community Courts, whose jurisdiction and the number
of judges for which shall be established by Supreme Court Rule. The
President Judge of the District Court shall appoint Commissioners to
accept bail, issue warrants and otherwise assist the judges of the
Community Court of the District.
The Supreme Court is to have general supervisory and administrative authority over all the Courts of the Commonwealth. Judges
may be temporarily assigned from one court or district to another. s
The Chief Justice is to exercise his court's powers of administration,
and the Supreme Court is to appoint an administrative director and
staff to assist the Chief Justice. The Supreme Court is given the rule
making power. Rules are to have the force of law and shall suspend
all statutes with which they are inconsistent.
28. See Sutton and Linn, The Intercourt Assignment of Judges in Colorado, 33
ROCKY MT.

L. Rnv. 480 (1961).
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Clerks of Court and other non-judicial personnel are constitutionally established, and may be appointed by the respective courts with
respect to which they are to act, except that the Supreme Court may
otherwise provide by rule with respect to the District Courts and
Estates Courts. The Supreme Court may also prescribe a merit system
for appointment, promotion, removal, discipline and suspension of
non-judicial personnel.
The Supreme Court is also to establish a Judicial Council in
accordance with its rules to conduct studies for improvement of the
administration of justice for law reform and for such other purposes
as provided by Supreme Court Rule.29
The capstone of any judicial reform is the unification of the
system of justice. In this respect the Pennsylvania proposal adheres
closely to the Model Judicial Article suggested by the American Bar
Association.3" The significant differences which exist are as follows:
First, the Model Article does not contemplate any separate Estates
Courts as under the Pennsylvania Plan, but would rather include them
as divisions of the District Courts. This is a major and unfortunate
concession. It is undoubtedly due to the fact that Pennsylvania's
Orphans' Courts and the judges who adorn them are in general, highly
respected, efficient and capable. There is a feeling that their integrity
will be diluted if their independent status is not retained. If, however,
the proposed plan is adopted, the entire judiciary should rise to the
standard now enjoyed by the Orphans' Courts. In that event, if the
Estates Courts were divisions of the District Courts rather than separate
entities, the cause of modern efficiency would seem to be advanced.3"
Second, under the Model Article, appeals directly to the Supreme
Court are allowed where a sentence of 25 years or more has been imposed, in addition to sentences of death or life imprisonment, which
are as far as the Pennsylvania proposal goes. The difference is one of
degree, and a small difference at that.
Third, under the Model Article, the intermediate Appellate Court
is to sit in divisions as determined by the Supreme Court, with each
division corsisting of three judges. The net result may be about the
same as under the Pennsylvania proposal, which provides for one
Court which may sit in panels of not less than three judges.
Thus, it can be seen that, with the exception of the major concession made to the Orphans' Courts, the Pennsylvania proposal follows
closely the Model Judicial Article proposed by the American Bar Asso29. Kenworthey and Banks, supra note 1, at 245-47.
30. Holt, supra note 21.
31. SCHULMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 146-47.
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ciation. In this respect, it closely approximates the reform which occurred in New Jersey in 1948, Puerto Rico in 1952, Alaska in 1956,.
Kansas in 1958, s2 Arizona in 1960,83 Iowa and New York in 1961,4
North Carolina 5 and Illinois in 1962.6

III.
THE MINOR JUDICIARY

The system of Magistrates, Justices of the Peace and Aldermen
in Pennsylvania has long been the subject of angry indignation. Pennsylvania is unique in that its minor judiciary has not been required to
be learned in the law, and, as numerous investigations have proved, it
is a judiciary too often quite unlearned in the law, though most experienced in the art of politics. 37 It is not a judiciary of record.
The proposal of the Pennsylvania Bar Association is to abolish
all existing courts not of record in Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties
and other judicial districts where a majority of the voters so decide
and supersede them by Community Courts, which are to be courts of
limited jurisdiction exercised through divisions established by Supreme
Court Rule. The Supreme Court is also to determine the number of
judges for the Community Courts in each district, and the judges are
to be selected in the same manner as judges of the District Court, and
have the same qualifications, including membership in the Bar of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and residence in the judicial district
for which they are selected.38
Under the proposal, the President Judge of the District Court is
empowered to appoint Commissioners for the district to accept bail,
issue warrants or otherwise assist the judges of the Community Courts
as prescribed by Supreme Court Rule. The Supreme Court is to prescribe the qualifications and restrictions for Commissioners, except
that Commissioners must be citizens of the Commonwealth and residents of the judicial districts for which they are appointed.
32. Waterman, Recent Reforms in Judicial Administration, 45 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y

69 (1962).

33. Ibid; Douglas, Arizona's New Judicial Article, 2 ARIz. L. REv. 159 (1960).
34. Court ReorganizationReforms - 1962, 46 J. AM. Juo. Soc'Y 110 (1962).
35. Comment, Court Reform, 42 N.C.L. Rzv. 858 (1964).
36. Chandler, The New Judicial Article for Illinois, 50 ILL. B.J. 654 (1962)
Hershey, The Proposed New Judicial Article, 50 ILL. B.J. 466 (1962).
37. See SCHULMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 88-137; BUREAU OF MUNICIPAL
RESEARCH AND
PHILADELPHIA

ECONOMY LEAGUE, THE MAGISTRATES COURTS OF
PENNSYLVANIA
ERVIN, THE MAGISTRATES COURTS OF PHILADELPHIA (1931).

(1958);

The attorney general of the Commonwealth is currently conducting a wide-ranging
investigation of the Philadelphia magistracy.
38. For the qualifications, see supra, p. 263.
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The American Bar Association's Model State Judicial Article
establishes a trial court of limited jurisdiction known as the Magistrate's
Court, and it is to have the number of judges determined by the Supreme Court. There is no residence requirement. The court's jurisdiction is to be established by Supreme Court Rule, and appeals may,
by Supreme Court Rule, lie to the District Court. Magistrates are
appointed for three-year terms by the Chief Justice and must be licensed
to practice law in the courts of the state. Considerably less attention
is given to magistrates than to judges on the questions of tenure,
89
compensation and retirement.
The Pennsylvania proposal would seem, in some respects, to be
an improvement over that of the Model Article. Firstly, it is wise, in
view of the sad reputation of Magistrates Courts in Philadelphia, to
abolish the name, and Corpmunity Courts is a new and descriptive
appellation.
Secondly, it is important to give Community Courts the same
status as other courts with respect to selection of judges, tenure and
retirement.
However, Pennsylvania's plan is weak in two respects: First, it
is only optional outside Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties; and,
second, it contains a residence requirement which is as unnecessary for
Community Court judges as it is for judges of the District Court.4"
The reform of the minor judiciary should be mandatory for all
counties. This should be even more true where the fee system of
justices of the peace still obtains than in Philadelphia and Allegheny
Counties, which are the only counties where the minor judiciary is
salaried. The complete integration of -the minor judiciary into the
administration of the Commonwealth's judicial system should greatly
aid the correction of the evils so frequently demonstrated. 4'
Reform of the minor judiciary has occurred in a number of other
states in recent years.4" As an example, in Illinois' recent reform, justices of the peace (including a fee system) were abolished, and magistrates are to be appointed by the circuit judges in each circuit to serve
at their pkasure; but magistrates need not be lawyers, nor are they
required to devote full time to the job.48
39. Holt, supra note 21.
40. See supra, p. 264.
41. See supra, note 37.
42. Tennessee (1937-60), New Jersey (1948), California and Hawaii (1950),
Puerto Rico (1952), Alaska (1956), Ohio (1957), Connecticut (1959), Arizona
(1960), New York (1961), Illinois, North Carolina, Colorado (1962). Winters, The
Judicial Reform Movement in America Today, CONSENSUS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON
THE EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND THE PA. BAR Ass'N 53, 57-58 (1964).
43. Giese, Why Illinois Proposes To Abolish Justice Of The Peace Courts, 50
ILL. B.J. 677 (1962).
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Reform of Pennsylvania's minor judiciary seems inevitable in the
not too distant future. It would appear that Pennsylvania might not
make the mistake in compromising quality qualifications for its minor
court judges which was made in Illinois. It should not, however,
deprive 65 of Pennsylvania's 67 counties of the benefits of the reform
by limiting its applicability.
CONCLUSION

No solution is perfect, and it is not suggested that the present
proposal of the Pennsylvania Bar Association is an exception. The
important feature of judicial reform in Pennsylvania today is that there
exists a proposal on which there is a greater consensus than any other
ever advanced. It is a proposal which, if adopted, would constitute a
great step forward. It is to be hoped that it may even be strengthened
in- several important respects, such as state-wide application of the plan
for judicial selection and of reform of the minor judiciary and elimination of separate Estates Courts, prior to adoption.
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